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playground:compliance
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playground:compliance [2012/08/22 11:53] carter |
playground:compliance [2012/08/22 13:52] (current) carter |
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| 3. The EMO and Radiation Monitor System are independent. Other independent interlocks for equipment protection are not subject to this rule. | 3. The EMO and Radiation Monitor System are independent. Other independent interlocks for equipment protection are not subject to this rule. | ||
| - | 4. We have great confidence in the safety provided by the original Shut-down Module and the process in which operators confirm its functionality at start-up. In addition to the original Shut-down Module we have added the following additional interlocks to the accelerator operation. A redundant independent shut-down relay must be energized by the lack of an accumulated dose value to allow accelerator operation. A redundant independent shut-down relay must also be energized by the lack of a maximum dose rate of 100 mR/H signal to allow accelerator operation. This arrangement gives backup shut-down mechanisms for both accumulated dose shut-down and also maximum rate shut-down. An additional circuit to detect the maximum dose rate has also been implemented as a backup for the maximum dose rate detection electronics that will shut down the accelerator at 160 mR/H. If the radiation monitor or the shut-down module do not have power applied the accelerator will shut-down. The accelerator will also shut-down if the interconnect cable between the radiation monitor and Shut-down module is removed. | + | 4. We have great confidence in the safety provided by the original Shut-down Module and the process in which operators confirm its functionality at start-up. In addition to the original Shut-down Module we have added the following additional interlocks to the accelerator operation. A redundant independent shut-down relay must be energized by the lack of an accumulated dose greater than 20 mR to allow accelerator operation. The redundant independent shut-down relay must also be energized by the lack of a maximum dose rate of 100 mR/H signal to allow accelerator operation. If this relay fails, the accelerator will shut-down. This arrangement gives backup shut-down mechanisms for both accumulated maximum dose shut-down and also maximum dose rate shut-down. An additional circuit to detect the maximum dose rate has also been implemented as a backup for the maximum dose rate detection electronics that will shut down the accelerator at a dose rate of 160 mR/H in the event the 100 mR/H detection system would fail. If the radiation monitor or the shut-down module do not have mains power applied the accelerator will shut-down. The accelerator will also shut-down if the interconnect cable between the radiation monitor and Shut-down module is removed. |
| 5. We consider this requirement to be met by having to ensure that a door interlock is properly engaged after a shutdown by the Radiation Monitor System, or by having to reset the EMO button in that type of shutdown. We exceed this requirement by the fact that the ACPC in the Vault must be reset after any type of shutdown. | 5. We consider this requirement to be met by having to ensure that a door interlock is properly engaged after a shutdown by the Radiation Monitor System, or by having to reset the EMO button in that type of shutdown. We exceed this requirement by the fact that the ACPC in the Vault must be reset after any type of shutdown. | ||
playground/compliance.1345650839.txt.gz ยท Last modified: 2012/08/22 11:53 by carter
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